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RECENT CASES

EVIDENCE - HEARSAY STATEMENT IN THE NATURE OF
A DECLARATION AGAINST A PENAL INTEREST
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE EVEN THOUGH THE UNAVAILABILITY OF THE DECLARANT IS NOT ESTABLISHED. People v. Spriggs (Cal. 1964).
Spriggs and a companion, Mrs. Roland, were arrested for possession of narcotics. Mrs. Roland made a statement to the arresting
officer that the narcotics belonged to her. Spriggs alone was tried.
During cross-examination by defense counsel, the arresting officer
was asked to relate the substance of his conversation with Mrs.
Roland at the time of the arrest. The prosecutor's objection to this
question was sustained on grounds of hearsay and immateriality.
Spriggs' subsequent conviction was reversed on appeal. The Supreme Court of California held that the testimony should have been
admitted as a declaration against penal interest and that the failure
to show the unavailability of the declarant was not a bar to admission. People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr.
841 (1964).
Declarations against the proprietary and pecuniary interests of the
declarant are well established exceptions to the rule prohibiting the
admission of hearsay evidence,1 and are recognized by statute in
California.' However, declarations against penal interest have not
enjoyed the same degree of acceptance.' The usual reason advanced
for barring the admission of declarations against penal interest is
that the introduction of such statement into evidence would create
a possibility of the inclusion of fabricated testimony.4 Numerous
arguments have been offered in various dissenting opinions which
favor the admission of this class of declaration as an exception to
the hearsay rule. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Donnely v. United
States,' said, "[N]o other statement is so much against interest as a
confession of murder; it is far more calculated to convince than
dying declarations, which would be let in to hang a man ... "6
Spriggs specifically overruled previous California decisions' which
had excluded hearsay declarations against penal interests. In justify' Bowen v. Chase, 98 U.S. 254 (1879); Wallace v. Oswald, 57 Cal. App. 333, 207
Pac. 51 (1922); see generally, 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1455-77 (3d ed. 1940).
2 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.§§ 1853, 1870, 1946.
3 Donnely v. United States, 228 U.s. 243 (1913); People v. Hall, 94 Cal. 595, 30
Pac. 7 (1892); Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Clark & F. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L.

1844).

4 E.g., Lyon v. State, 22 Ga. 399, 401 (1857). For Wigmore's comment on this
case see 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra, note 1, § 1447 n.2.
5 228 U.S. at 277.
0 Id. at 278, accord, Petition of Winineger, 337 P.2d 445, 452 (Okla. Crim. App.
1958) (Nix, J., dissenting).
7 E.g., People v. Hall, 94 Cal. 595, 30 Pac. 7 (1892).

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

ing the court's action in creating new exceptions in an area of the
law seemingly pre-empted by statute, Justice (now Chief Justice)
Traynor said that admissible hearsay is not limited to the types enumerated by the statutes.8 Justice Traynor was of the opinion that the
courts consider the statutory provisions as foundations upon which
to build the law of evidence, and, therefore, they may expand those
statutory rules.' Since declarations against penal interest are not expressly excluded by statute, the Spriggs decision does not contravene
the statutes, but, rather, represents an addition to a long list of
court-made rules of evidence.
The Spriggs court stated that declarations against penal interest
are no less trustworthy than those against proprietary or pecuniary
interests.1" As early as 1955 there were indications that this viewpoint would eventually be enthroned as law in California. In People
v. One 1948 Chevrolet11 the court said that an individual's interest
in avoiding criminal liability gives reasonable assurance
of the ve12
racity of statements made contrary to that interest.
Traditionally courts and writers have stated that four facts must
be established as a prerequisite to the admission of a declaration
against interest: (1) the unavailability of the declarant; (2) that
the declaration, when made, was contrary to the declarant's apparent pecuniaray or proprietary interest; (3) that the declarant had
knowledge of the facts with which the declaration is concerned;
(4) the improbability of a motive to falsify.1" It is obvious that
factors (2), (3) and (4) deal with circumstances prevailing at the
time when the declaration was uttered, and permit its admission, if
under those circumstances the declaration is shown to be trustworthy.
Theoretically, the most trustworthy testimony is that which has survived the fiery crucibles of cross-examination and the observation of
the witness' demeanor in court.1 The objection to the admission of
hearsay is based upon the fact that such statements are not subject
8 60 Cal. 2d at 873, 389 P.2d at 380, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 844.

Id. at 873, 389 P.2d at 380, 36 Cal. Rtpr. at 844. It should be noted that Professor Wigmore would do away with all codification of evidentiary rules as
being, ".... obstructive or confusing rather than helpful; for they... merely restate, in a form too concise to be useful, the established common-law rule ....
5 WGMoRE, op. cit. supra, note 1, § 1455.
10 60 Cal. 2d at 874, 389 P.2d at 381, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
21
45 Cal. 2d 613, 290 P.2d 538 (1955).
12 Id. at 622, 290 P.2d at 544. At least one court seems to have intimated that dec.
larations against social interest are admissible. State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 559, 64
Pac. 1014 (1904); see also, MODERN CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509 (1942);
UNIFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE 63 (10) (1953).
13 Clark & Jones Inc. v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 889
(E.D. Tenn. 1953); see also 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 217 (1964).
14 See, Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARv. L. REV. 177 (1948).
9
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to these traditional tests. For the courts to accept an extra-judicial
and hence a theoretically less trustworthy statement, some necessity
should exist. A majority of the cases have held that the unavailability of the declarant (regardless of the cause) creates that necessity. 5 It would seem, however, that the true criterion for admissibility should be trustworthiness; not an artificial technicality dependent upon conditions existing at the time of trial.
The requirement that the declarant be dead originated in England. 6 Many writers have denounced the strict requirement of death
and assert that 'unavailability' should include other situations. 7
Judicial liberalizations of the doctrine have encompassed declarants
who are absent for the jurisdiction, 8 insane, 9 or who refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination."
It is recognized that some hearsay statements should be admitted
into evidence since the benefit of various classes of otherwise credible testimony would be lost entirely unless they are accepted untested by cross-examination. 2 That credible evidence may be lost
should be sufficient necessity for admission into evidence if, indeed,
necessity must be shown. The requirement of unavailability, to
which a majority of the courts stringently adhere, serves no purpose
in many instances other than to preclude the introduction of otherwise trustworthy evidence. There seems to be no logical justification
for continuing to automatically impose it.22 It is submitted that the
sole criterion for the admission of hearsay declarations should be
the trustworthiness of the statement at the time it is uttered. If such
were the universal rule, declarations against interest would be admissible regardless of the availability of the witness, as well they
should, since such declarations are normally trustworthy because
very few individuals will concede the existence of facts which will
cause them substantial personal harm.23
The Spriggs court eliminated the unavailability of the declarant
as a condition precedent to the admission of declarations against
'15 Cf., Alabama Power Co. v. Ray, 249 Ala. 568, 32 So. 2d 219 (1947); Newberry
v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 61 S.E.2d 318 (1952).
'6 Harrison v. Blades, 3 Camp. 457, 170 Eng. Rep. 1444 (K.B. 1813).
27 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra, note 1, § 1456; Morgan, Declarations Against Interest, in SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL 820 (Fryer
ed. 1958).
Is Neely v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 241 Mo. App. 1244, 252 S.W.2d 88

(1952).

'9

20

Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1915).
Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d (1945).

21

5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra, note 1, §§ 1420, 1421.

22

2. B. JONES, EIDENCE § 295 (5th ed. 1958).

23

Morgan, supra note 17, at 820.
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penal interest."4 In Spriggs the actual unavailability of the witness
need not have been proven in order to admit Mrs. Roland's statement into evidence. This issue could have been disposed of within
the framework of the contemporary law. " As the court itself pointed
out, if called as a witness Mrs. Roland could have refused to testify
as to her ownership of the narcotics by invoking the privilege
against self-incrimination." Since for that reason it might very well
have been futile to call her as a witness, the court could have found
that she was effectively unavailable. But the court chose not to
follow that course, and by stating that Mrs. Roland's availability
could not be a bar to the admission of the statement, the court has
deleted the requirement of unavailability as a prerequisite to the
admission into evidence of declarations against penal interests.
The question remains, however, whether the requirement of unavailability is now abrogated as to other declarations against interest; i.e., those against proprietry and pecuniary interests. The court's
language seems to be equally applicable to any statement against
the interest of the declarant:
If she was available, however, the credibility of her extrajudicial
statements would not be lessened by that fact. . . Thus, in the
event of a retrial, defense counsel should be allowed to ask . . .
the question objected 2 to, whether or not the unavailability of Mrs.
Roland is established. 7
It should be kept in mind, however, that a declaration against a
penal interest involves elements of self-incrimination and the privilege of the witness to refuse to testify. Constructive unavailability
will normally be present in situations involving a penal declaration
and therefore Spriggs logically breaks with the past. It is submitted
that the court, when the opportunity presents itself, should clarify
the requirements of unavailability in all situations involving declarations against interest. Such a clarification in the Spriggs case would
have been dictum, but dictum is often the basis of enforceable, recognizable rules of law.2 ' Although Spriggs has failed to clarify this
area of the evidentiary rules, the decision represents a logical progression in the law of evidence.
Robert E. Madruga
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60 Cal. 2d at 876, 398 P.2d at 382, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945).
60 Cal. 2d at 875, n.3, 398 P.2d at 381, n.3, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 845, n.3.
Id. at 875, 389 P.2d at 381, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
See e.g., Donnell v. Linforth, 11 Cal. App. 2d 25, 52 P.2d 937 (1936).

